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The Rural Sociologist

Two Agricultural Economists Look at Rural Sociology
B. Delworth Gardner and Carole Frank Nuckton
University of California-Davis
At the invitation of the editor, we shall attempt to describe our
perceptions as agricultural economists of what is known to us as rural
sociology. We should say right off that we are complimented that this
invitation has been extended to us. We think that a comparison of our
two disciplines has been useful to us, if only to clarify our thinking
about our own. We emphasize that our perceptions are based on limited
contact, and we have made no systematic study of your discipline. Even
to attempt the critique and analysis of the kind requested of us
presumes an arrogance on our part that is somewhat discomfiting. There
will no doubt be a considerable disparity between our view and what you
see as reality. But rest assured that we realize that we see through a
glass darkly. In fact, it is quite likely that this piece will have
more entertainment value for you than any serious scientific.worth.
Still, both of us probably have hqd relatively more contact with
rurai sociology than have most other agricultural economists. And
these contacts serve to illustrate how far apart the two disciplines
may be and how difficult communication between them is. For example,
the first author has been a member of several Ph.D. sociology oral exam
committees, generally for students who have minors in economics. These
experiences have been frustrating to him and to some extent to the
examined students as well. Both questions asked by sociologists and
apparently answers expected from the students appeared to lack
precision and rigor. They seemed very broad and lacking in focus. In
short, they seemed to lack the context of a framework that narrowed the
scope of the inquiry. On the other hand, his questions were taken to
be unrealistically narrow and removed from the real world in which
people actually live and work. Unfortunately, the student was often
caught in the middle, but usually gave answers acceptable to the
questioning party if not entirely satisfactory to other members of the
committee. Also, the first author has reviewed perhaps a dozen
articles submitted to rural-sociology journals, probably because he
knew the editors and presumably had some knowledge about the topics
being discussed in the papers. He has not kept a careful tally but
remembers that he recommended rejection for a big majority and, in a
case or two, recommended revisions that considered issues that were
important to him that had not been addressed in the paper. He has been
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invariably disappointed in the methodology employed. As a rule, the
papers have not identified a.researchable "problem," used theory to
deduce testable hypotheses, nor adequately performed empirical tests.
The other side of the coin has been no more successful. He has
submitted three papers to rural-sociology journals, believing that they
would be of interest to readers of those journals. All were rejected
with the editor's admonition that they were too narrow to be of
interest to journal readers. All were later published in either
economics journals or reviewed agricultural-experiment-station
bulletins.
The second author has had similar experiences with two manuscripts
submitted to rural-sociology journals. Reviewers of the first found
the paper to be "well-written and insightful, but not directed toward a
sociological audience." All three of the reviewers appealed for "more
attention to the work of rural sociologists and other social
scientists, rather than just that of agricultural economists." The
second manuscript was also rejected with the comment that the work of
rural sociologists in the area had been neglected. Since the second
author was not familiar with literature outside agricultural economics,,
a rural sociologist at another university was asked to collaborate on a
revision. A few sociological works were cited in the literature review
section, the rural sociologist was made a co-author, and.the manuscript
was ::\cceptedl
Wha~ 1s going on here? Naturally, separate disciplines focus on
different problems and employ different theories and empirical
techniques. That is why they are separate disciplines. Specific
languages have evolved to satisfy the scientific needs of these
disciplines. Each field has its own literature that is read primarily
by people in that field. So why should the experiences we've described
not be expected? In fact, we would probably have been surprised if the
outcome had been much different. If economists and sociologists coul~
easily publish in each other's journals, one of them or both would
probably be expendable. Still, we believe that we have seen some
differences in approach that may be important for both groups to
understand. At least we won't be harborin~ illusions about how easy 1t
is to crash each other's academic parties.

KUHN'S PARADIGM
Kuhn's (1970) analysis of the nature of science will serve as a
convenient framework and point of departure for the discussion. Kuhn's
view is that a science is mature when it settles on a single paradigm
that transforms the researchers, associated with various schools within
a discipline, into a profession. The synthesis achieved by reaching
consensus on a paradigm (an "ah-ha" experience) defines the field and
creates the mechanism by which scientific progress can be made.
Participant researchers (believers?) perform what Kuhn calls "mop-up"
work--articulating the paradigm and extending it to other areas of
~xperience. The paradigm gives researchers the criteria for choosin~
3olvable problems ("puzzles") and selecting from among formerly
Jeaningless data only those pertaining to the problem. '
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It is not part of the research agenda of such a mature science for
members to challenge or even investigate the established paradigm, for
it is sacrosanct and accepted by the club. The paradigm determines the
scope of the view of the world, identifies the crucial problems, and
postulates the significant explanatory variables. It may even at time:
set the bounds for prescribing a better condition for the world. The
upshot is that the accepted paradigm creates expectations; when there
is a discrepancy between what subscribers expect to observe and what
they actually see, a problem emerges that cries for investigation. If
it is solved, another notch has been cut in the belt of scientific
progress. In contrast, an immature science has competing paradigms.
It tends to make progress slowly, if at all, since much of the
intellectual energy of the scientists is dissipated in debating the
merits and demerits of alternative paradigms.·
Kuhn goes on to explain the nature of scientific revolution-conceptual blockbusting on a grand scale, as when Copernicus switched
the idea of what goes around what. Against the expectations/background
provided by the established paradigm, anomalies are noticed by some
mavericks in the profession or outside it that seem incapable of
resolution with the established paradigm. The crowd, however, either
ignores them or tries to rationalize them away. It is very much
threatened by the possibility that its investment in human capital will
be rendered obsolete by any new paradigm, mastery of which would
require a large commitment of scarce financial and time resources. The
expected loss in wealth and status that would ensue if the new replaced
the old causes those who understand the old to hold on tenaciously and
resist the new with great vigor. But those who have not invested so'
much and have most of their professional lives ahead have much less to
lose, and they persist and eventually create a crisis. When the new
sun-centered paradigm is simply irresistible, a scientific revolution
takes place. When the dust settles, those with too much invested in
the old simply become irrelevant or retire. Normal science begins
afresh under the replacement parad5'0!1.
We believe Kuhn's paradigm model to be strongly relevant-to both
economics and sociology in their present states. In fact, we would
argue that nearly all of the past frustrations resulting from our
contacts with sociology can be explained by our compulsion to put the
problems encountered into our dominant paradigm. We treat problems
this way almost automatically because our discipline is trying to do
normal science in the Kuhnian sense. The understandable reaction of
sociologists to our paradigmatic posturing has been antagonistic since
they have not yet settled on a single framework; rather, different
sociologists have their favorite paradigms, none of which is akin to
ours. Since this hypothesis--that economics is a relatively mature
science working at articulating its paradigm while sociology is a
multi-paradigm discipline not yet doing normal science--is central to
the purpose of this paper, we shall develop it at some length.
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PARADIGMS AND SOCIOLOGY
If economics is immature--say, in its late teens--then, in our
opinion, sociology is still in 'infancy as a science. It is at the
stage of haggling about paradigms, not yet having settled on one, and
thus not yet ready to do normal science. We consulted three books in
sociology--THE IDEOLOGY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS (Reasons and Perdue, 1981),
SOCIOLOGY: A MULTIPLE PARADIGM SCIENCE (Ritzer, 1975), and SOCIOLOGY
(Robertson, 1977). We must leave it to readers in sociology to judge
how representative these books are of the field. The first two books
mentioned explicitly utilize Kuhn's paradigm framework for their
~nalyses. We gather the third is an elementary textbook for
introductory sociology--just right for us. Robertson discusses
sociology's paradigms without mentioning Kuhn.
Paradigms are dP.fined by Reasons and Perdue (1981:4) as "models of
society ••• " that "shape not only scholarly explanations and
definitions, but also the general views most of us hold about so~ial
problems." A paradigm is a "mind set" specifying the issues and
questions to be addressed, enabling the researcher to be selective. w~
have absolutely no quarrel with this definition. Reasons and PerduP
describe two major paradigms for sociology--order and conflict.
Robertson adds one in addition to these two--interactionism. Ritzer
puts order and conflict under one of his and then uses a different
thought-classification system entirely which he calls "paradigmatic."
Following Robertson, we will briefly describe three major
sociological perspectives--paradigms. This will either be old-hat to
our readers or heresy if our interpretation is not valid! ·The first,
the functionalist perspective, tracing back to Spencer and Durkheim,
focuses on the basic order in society and sees the specialized elements
in society as analogous to organs in a living body. The second, the
conflict perspective, stemming from Marx, emphasizes that the elements
ln society are always in tension, hostility, competition, and sometimes
)Utright violence for scarce ends--power, wealth, prestige. The third,
;he interactionist perspective, influenced by Weber, does not focus on
social structures but on individual-level relations and interactional
behavior.
Ritzer, calling sociology a multiple paradigm science, rer·ers to
these traditional categories as theories and places them (and other
theories) under three other "paradigms:" social facts, social
definition, and social behavior. "Social factists" look at social
structure. (Q._g., a group, a bureaucracy) or an institution (_g_.g., a
family, a religion) as "real" things, focusing on their nature and
interrelationships. Functionalism (order) and conflict are theories
about social facts. "Social definitionists" study intra- and
inter-subjectivity and the action that results. The interest is in the
way individuals define their social structures. Weber's interactionist
perspective is included here. The social-behavior paradigm is really
psychology applied to sociological problems. The interest is in
understanding, predicting, and changing the behavior of man. Ritzer
(1975:26) states that the adherents of each of these paradigms "attempt
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to deny the validity of the other paradigms," Thus, it would seem
that, if he is right, sociology fully qualifies as an immature science,
since haggling over paradigms is the chief Kuhnian characteristic of an
immature science.
What does all this add up to for the purpose of this paper? We
are in no position to judge the validity of the competing claims for
paradigmatic superiority in sociology. Whether Kuhn is even right
about competing paradigms as the hallmark of an immature science,
perhaps only philosophers and historians of science can fully assess.
It occurs to us, however, that sociologists might argue that the
scientific scope of sociology is very broad, and that various paradigms
are needed and justified if social phenomena of such'great diversity
are to be satisfactorily explained. Could be! We would observe simply
that your field is so broad that many of your "problems" are also of
interest to us. But our perception is that you are guided to a
different set of explanatory variables by your paradigms than we are by
ours. The upshot is that when we ·review your work, it appears that yo1,
never formulate the questions adequately, never establish an adequate
theoretical base, and seldom perform a satisfactory empirical test.

PARADIGt1S AND ECONOMICS
Discussing the tremendous variety of positions on economic policy
by economists is a favorite passion of the press these days. As an
example, in its January 31st issue of 1983, THE U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT (Anonymous, 1983:66-71) interviewed six Nobei-Prize economists
on "How to Get the Country Hoving Again." The results must have made
the public wonder why a prize is given in the so-called science of
economics.
1 Milton Friedman: "The most important single action we can.take now is
for the Federal Reserve to lower the rate of monetary growth •••• The
key is for the Fed to stick to the targets it has set rather than
erratically allowing an explosion in growth and then cutting way back."

• Kenneth Arrow: "Continued monetary ease to bring about a further
decline in interest rates is the most important single step we can take
to get a recovery going •••• The Federal Reserve was correct last year
when it decided to allow money-supply growth to exceed the narrowest
monetary target."
• Paul Samuelson: "President Reagan and the Federal Reserve should
continue allowing more growth in the money supply until we are
definitely in a healthy recovery with an annual growth rate of at least
4 percent after adjustment for inflation."
• George Stigler: "One thing that could be done to help achieve
stability would be to eliminate the large swings in the money supply
such as we had during the first and second halves of 1982."
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Lawrence Klein: "The t"irst thing .;o be done to get the economy moving
again, apart from letting natural forces work, is to continue the
course on monetary policy that was initiated a few months ago, making
credit conditions easier."
James Tobin: "We need, above all, an expansionary monetary
policy--one that will bring real interest rates down to reasonable
levels •••• "
All agreea cnat monetary policy was of central importance, but what
does it mean when scholars recognized as the best by the Nobel
Committee are so completely polarized about what ought to be done,
Recommendations were almost as disparate concerning the deficit,
unemployment, taxes, and whether the government should have an
industrial policy. For one looking at economics from the outside,
including, certainly, policy makers earnestly seeking guidance,
economic science must seem a shambles.
These major macroeconomic disagreements, however, may represent a
full-blown Kuhnian revolution (a mature science in crisis turning over
its paradigmatic structure), haggling over paradigms as in a Kuhnian
immature science, or simply a contest among theories subsumed under a
more general paradigm. It appears that Friedman (1953:25) would
subscribe to the third view; he noted that differences in economic
policy:
derive predominantly from different predictions about the
economic consequences of taking action--differences that in
principle can be eliminated by the progress of positive
economics--rather than from fundamental differences in basic
values, differences about which men can ultimately only
fight.
We believe that Friedman is essentially correct. The question is
whether positive economic science can yield the answers needed to such
important policy questions within a reasonable time frame. The fact
that most economists seem to be working within a given paradigm at
least gives us some hope. That paradigm is economic efficiency, an
allocation of scarce resources such that the value of output is a
maximum. Nearly all main-stream economists work in a framework that
assumes rational utility-maximizing consumers and profit-maximizing
firms, all constrained in their options by limits on income and time
that make economizing relevant. The market where voluntary choices
enhance the welfare of both buyer and seller is the primary
institutional device utilized for this economizing. This dominant
paradigm goes all the way back to Adam Smith (1776). In his Nobel
lecture, Stigler (1983:532) said:
It was Smith who prov1aea so broad and authoritative an
account of the known economic doctrine that, henceforth, it
was no longer permissible for any subsequent writer on
economics to advance his own ideas while ignoring the state
of general knowledge.
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In Kuhnian terms, some of the advances in economic theory such as
"the addition of the principle of variable factor proportions, or the
notion of the consumer with relatively stable transitive preferences"
(Gordon, 1965:124) can be seen as a "further articulation" of Smith's
basic paradigm. ·so can Baumol' s ( 1982) "perfectly contestable markets"
and Stigler and Becker's (1977) treatment of the consumer as having a
production function for utility, using not only market goods as inputs
but also human time. These are examples of paradigm articulation and
extension--of doing 11 norma1 11 • science. Thus, we see economics as
growing up, but with a struggle. It obviously is an immature
discipline as sciences go. It is fractionated by schools, and if you
want to predict how an economist really feels in her/his heart of
hearts, especially about economic policy, just~find out where he/she
was trained. This is hardly a convincing testimonial for scientific
objectivity and maturity.

ADDITIONAL DIFFERENCES IN METHODOLOGY
In addition to the questions of appropriate paradigms that divide
us are the various roles of theory and data, an area we know as
methodology. In outlining his new paradigmatic classification scheme,
Ritzer (1975) briefly described the methodology used by each paradigm.
Under the social-facts paradigm; he mentioned that questionnaires or
interviews are the preferred method but questioned whether this
individual-level method can get at social facts. He suggested instead
using the comparative and historical method to study social facts. The
social-definition group employs a method called simply "observation."
The social behaviorist turns to the experiment--either in a laboratory
or in a real-world setting. But with respect to each paradigm we would
ask questions? What is to be asked in a questionnaire? What is to be
observed? What experiment? How can we know what to look for without
clear guidance from a theory that postulates the crucial explanatory
relationships?
It seems to us that the first step after the identification of a
"problem" or a "puzzle" in any scientific study is the building of a
theoretical model that sets forth causal relationships that are
hypothesized to hold. Then, to test hypotheses, the model is given ar.
empirical specification that clarifies what data are relevant. In our
field, this usually consists of some econometric or optimization
specification. Using data specifically identified and collected,
parameters of the model are estimated and tested for statistical
significance as hypothesized. Our limited exposure to manuscripts from
~ural sociologists has revealed a propensity to proceed with empirical
Jbservation without the necessary theorizing for establishing
scientific causation, and this seems to be consistent-with our reading
of Ritzer.
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AN ILLUSTRATION
To illustrate how different our approach is from the way we
perceive yours, consider an important social problem in which both
sociologists and economists are very interested--divorce. First let us
present our notions about how we think sociologists would approach the
study of the issue. Having mastered statistical techniques,
sociologists would select a sample from the population of interest ana
collect data about it, most likely by interview. Information would be
categorized and crosstabulated, appropriate statistical tests would be
conducted, and conclusions (generalizations) drawn,(or perhaps Ritzer's
social behaviorists would probe deeper into the psychology of each
couple).
Using our economic paradigm, Becker (1981) provides a useful
theory of divorce. 2 He puts this individually traumatic experience
into terms that can be analyzed and explained as a social phenomenon.
The theory is actually quite complex and only the barest outline will
be presented. Participants in marriage are assumed to be rational
individuals who have limited information about the utility they can
expect with potential mates because of search and courting costs.
Resources are invested in acquiring information about desirable traits
in a mate, but information is too costly to be complete. Many
marriages fail early primarily because of imperfect information in
marriage markets and the accumulation of better.information during
marriage. A husband and wife would both consent to a divorce if, and
only if, they both expected to be better off divorced. The financial
settlement is the inducement for a recalcitrant spouse to consent to
divorce. Women with higher earnings gain less from marriage than other
women do because higher earnings reduce the advantages of the sexual
division of labor in marriage. Thus, women with higher earnings should
be more prone to divorce. Becker goes on to explore several
implications of his theory and then tests these implications with
relevant data from the real world. The explanation is useful because
it helps us to understand the societal phenomenon of divorce, perhaps
to predict its direction of growth or subsidence, to evaluate its
impacts on other aspects of society, and to plan at the policy
level--for example, the state's comoensation laws for the injurea
party,

CONCLUSION
In sum, the major difference between u~ is that economists have
cnosen to be more precise in a limited sphere of life, while
sociologists have elected to remain inexact but broad. The economist's
choice is well illustrated by reference to a well-known citation from
Machlup (1967). In discussing agricultural prices, he (1967:8) argued
that economists can only address the third of the followin~ questions
with any reasonable expectation of success:
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(1) What will be the prices of cotton textiles? (2) What
prices will the X Corporation charge? (3) How will the
prices of cotton textiles be affected by an increase in wage
rates? (4) How will the X Corporation change its prices when
wage rates are increased?

Only the third? What a sterile science economics has become! But we
believe it is significant that we can say something quite definitive
about the third question.
It is this very issue of the narrowness of scope and methods that
has caused some economist·s to be very critical c;,f modern economics
(Ward, 1972). In this they are joined by other social scientists, and
we would think most sociologists. You might enthusiastically agree
with Ward when he (on the jacket of his book) says: "Yet, this
sophisticated 'analytical machinery,' so effective in solving minor
puzzles, has proven unable to cope with many of the most important
problems of our time." Meanwhile, sociologists--without an established
paradigm and without much of a quantitative tool bag--have tackled
social problems such as alienation, crime, drugs, racism, sexism, the
aged (to simply repeat a few of the subjects from the chapter titles
from Reasons and Perdue). Sounds fascinating! Perhaps we are in the
wrong field! But, no, we have too much human capital invested now to
change disciplines. So we will probably go right on criticizing you
for fuzzy thinking, too little theory, and bad methodology.

NOTES
1

For purposes of the discussion, we choose to drop.both "agricultural"
and "rural" since our basic differences stem from those of our
respective parent disciplines--economics and sociology.
2

A short aside might be useful. Machlup's (1967) well known (to us)
analogy of the theoretical automobile driver may soften the blow
accompanying your reading of an economic explanation of divorce.
Theory (and paradigms) only serve to explain and predict effects of
mass behavior. When roads become wet and slippery and fog reduces
visibility, theory allows us to predict that traffic will slow and
accidents increase. Theory does not allow us to predict the behavior
of any particular driver, only the "theoretical reactions of a
hypothetical driver" (Machlup, 1967:6).

REFERENCES
Anonymous
1983 "How to get the country moving again. 11 U.S. News and World
Report 94(January 31):66-71.
Baumol, William J.
1982 "Contestable markets: an uprising in the theory o'f industry
structure." American Economic Review 72:1-15.

Volume 4, Number 2

109

Becker, Gary s.
1981 A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge (MA): B~rvard University
Press.
Friedman, Milton
1953 Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: Universitv or Chicago
Press.
Gordon, Donald_F.
1965 "The role of the history of economic 1,m.,ugnt in the
understanding of modern economic theory." American Economic
Review 55:119-127.
Kuhn, Thomas
1970 The Structure of Scientific Hevolut1ons (2nd ed.). Chica~o:
University of Chicago Press.
Machlup, Fritz
1967 "Theories of the firm: marginalist, behavioral, managerial."
American Economic Review 57:1-33.
Reasons, Charles E., and William D. Perdue
1981 The Ideology of Social Problems. Sherman Oaks (CA): Alfred.
Ritzer, George
1975 Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science. Boston: AHyn and
Bacon.
Robertson, Jan
1977 Sociology. New York: Worth.
Smith, Adam
1776 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
London: Printed for W. Strahan and T. Cadell in the Strand.
Stigler, George J.
1983 "Nobel lecture: the process and progress of economics."
Journal of Political Economy 91:529-543.
Stigler, George J., and Gary S. Becker
1977 "De gustibus non est disputandum." American Economic Review

67:76-90.
Ward, Benjamin
1972 What's Wrong with Economics?

New York: Basic.

